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Abstract
We provide evidence of the Peltzman eﬀect by tracking the professional path of each
hockey player that ended up in the National Hockey League from 2001 to 2006. We
take advantage of the fact that visor use has not always been compulsory throughout
a player’s career, which allows us to compare the change in behavior of users and
non-users of visors when they are forced to use them. We ﬁnd that whereas the
average penalty minutes per game is 0.8, visors cause a substantial increase of 0.2
penalty minutes per game. Players become more aggressive when forced to wear a
visor, partially oﬀsetting its protective eﬀect and creating potential spillover eﬀects to
other players.
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The eﬀectiveness of safety and protective devices, such as seat belts, airbags, helmets,
pads, safety caps, and the like, hinges on the critical assumption that the behavior of indi-
viduals remains constant regardless of the use of such equipment and devices. However, it is
uncertain whether this is the actual case, or whether individuals will change or adapt their
behavior in response to any extra protection in such a way that the intended eﬀect of the
protective device will end up diluted or even lost. Theoretically, protective equipment will
reduce the price of risky behavior and people will respond rationally by demanding more
risk. The possible existence of this compensating behavior was ﬁrst proposed by Peltzman
(1975) and is commonly referred to as the “Peltzman eﬀect”. This issue has long been the
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1subject of vigorous debate in economics. In fact, the Peltzman eﬀect has strong implications
which are not only circumscribed to local applications, but rather are at the heart of the
debate related to government intervention in the economy as this eﬀect is, in essence, directly
related to moral hazard issues.
While many researchers have long tried to show the existence, or lack thereof, of the
Peltzman eﬀect, the existing empirical evidence remains inconclusive. Initial attempts on
providing evidence on compensating behavior focus on laws requiring the use of seat belts in
the United States and elsewhere. Since “driving intensity” of the individual cannot be mea-
sured when seat belt use is required, researchers have studied fatalities among car occupants
and fatalities among non-occupants, as the latter are expected to be aﬀected only indirectly
by the less careful driving hypothetically caused by seat belts. Peltzman (1975),Crandall
and Graham (1984), Harvey and Durbin (1986), Asch, Levy, Shea and Bodenhorn (1991),
Garbacz (1992), Risa (1994), Loeb (1995), among others use time series and cross-section
data and ﬁnd some evidence on seatbelt laws and compensating behavior. Recently, Cohen
and Einav (2003) use an instrumental variable approach instrumenting seatbelt use with
changes in states regulations, and ﬁnd that seat belt use decreases occupants fatalities, but
has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on non-occupant deaths. This last ﬁnding does not support the
existence of compensating behavior. 1
The evidence on compensating behavior using seat belt data presents many shortcomings.
The most problematic issue is that most of the studies focus on aggregate, imprecise and
indirect measures of behavior, so that a truly clean exercise cannot be observed as it is
diﬃcult to control for aggregate time-varying variables. Moreover, the available evidence
is unable to identify which speciﬁc individuals are ‘treated’ and which ones are not. As
a consequence, the estimates produced may only be interpreted as average eﬀects, while
compensating behavior only arises locally from those who were actually treated (i.e., those
for whom the regulation was binding). Another issue is related to the fact that compliance
with laws may not be perfect, whereas usage can be very diﬃcult to measure. Furthermore,
seat belt use may be endogenous. Studies that apply instrumental variable procedures to
address this problem tend to use changes in regulation as an instrument, but these laws may
be associated with additional enforcement or they may be accompanied by safety campaigns,
which conceivably may reduce accidents and all type of deaths through diﬀerent channels.
If this is the case, such seat belt rules may not satisfy the exclusion restriction and may
be invalid instruments.2 Finally, empirical approaches that use time series analysis cannot
1On a related paper, Cohen and Dehejia (2004) ﬁnd moral hazard costs in terms of traﬃc fatalities when
focusing on compulsory insurance laws in the United States. Furthermore, they also ﬁnd that reductions in
accident liability produced by no-fault liability laws have led to an increase in traﬃc fatalities.
2Additionally, some types of enforcement may increase the cost of other infractions. For instance, in
2control for national shocks; whereas estimates using cross sections of locations may be biased
by unobserved state characteristics. Overall, all these issues make it diﬃcult to provide
credible evidence in favor or against the existence and extent of compensating behavior.
Given the limitations of the car seat belt literature, researchers have looked for other
empirical scenarios in which to test for compensating behavior. Car racing has provided
another fertile area to do so, as compliance is automatic and it does not require further en-
forcement, which helps avoid some of the issues that aﬀect the seat belt literature. However,
the resulting empirical evidence still remains unpersuasive. For instance, Pope and Tollison
(2010) ﬁnd that the introduction of a neck and head security device in NASCAR was as-
sociated with an increase in caution laps, their proxy of driving intensity. However, their
exercise faces many empirical diﬃculties. When the device was introduced, all racers but
one were already using it. This suggests that racers were already responding to increased
risks of accidents. Also, their ﬁndings may be capturing upward trends in the number of
accidents due to the existence of faster cars. In a related paper, Sobel and Nesbit (2007) ﬁnd
that the probability of injury is negatively related to accidents, measured again by caution
laps. While they use past injury rates as a proxy, this variable is unconvincing as it may
be endogenous since it may be related to changes in NASCAR that may aﬀect accidents, in
particular, increases in car speed. Furthermore, it might also be the case that after a few
years with high injury rates, NASCAR might have decided to ﬁne-tune the rules in order to
decrease accidents for subsequent seasons. In short, it is not clear whether drivers may be
responding to the change in the probability of injury caused by the exogenous introduction
of some protective device, as suggested by the Peltzman eﬀect.
In this paper we take a diﬀerent route in order to test for the presence of the Peltzman
eﬀect or compensating behavior. We do so by employing data from professional ice hockey
which allows us to overcome most, if not all, of the existing limitations of previous empirical
studies. In particular, we follow the career path of each hockey player that ended up in the
National Hockey League (NHL) from 2001 to 2006 and take advantage of the fact that visor
use has not always been compulsory throughout a player’s career. While currently the use
of hockey visors is not compulsory in the NHL, the top league in the world, its use has been
made mandatory in diﬀerent feeder leagues around the world at diﬀerent points in time.
This allows us to compare the behavior of individual NHL players who use a visor (control
group) and players who do not do so (treatment group) with respect to their behavior in
other leagues in which they were forced to wear a visor. Crucially, we are able to follow the
locations with secondary enforcement, drivers may be pulled over for committing unrelated infractions, and
receive an additional ﬁne if they are found not wearing seat belts. This may increase the cost of committing
an infraction for those not wearing one.
3playing path of each individual player and thus we are able to control for player ﬁxed eﬀects,
which typically may be a major source of bias. The required identiﬁcation assumption is that
the behavior of players that use visors in the NHL and those who do not will follow similar
trends as they change leagues, ignoring the eﬀect of visors. These institutional features of
professional ice hockey allow us to set an empirical research design that is analogous to a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach.
Unlike most of the existing empirical evidence produced to this day, we do ﬁnd that
there is signiﬁcant compensating or oﬀsetting behavior among hockey players when forced
to wear visors. We estimate that whereas the average penalty minutes per game is 0.8,
visors cause a substantial increase of 0.2 penalty minutes per game. In fact, we ﬁnd that
players that wear visors play more aggressively, partially oﬀsetting its protective eﬀect and
creating potential spillover eﬀects to other players. We also ﬁnd that the use of a visor does
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect performance, measured by goals and assists per game. We conduct
diﬀerent exercises to check the robustness of our results. In particular, we provide evidence
suggesting that our estimates are not driven by diﬀerences in adaptation as players change
leagues; or equivalently, suggesting that the equal trends assumption holds. These results are
meaningful as they imply that, contrary to common belief, mandatory use of visors do not
raise consciousness about safety. On the contrary, visors decrease the cost of unsafe skating,
which increases risk-taking and aggressiveness on the ice. In fact, some hockey commentators
have argued that skating behind a visor provides players with some sense of invincibility that
may actually lead them to skate more aggressively and recklessly. Additionally, players may
become reckless with their sticks if everyone else has protection (see Schwarz (2001) for an
example of these arguments in Lacrosse).
This paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we explain in detail the natural experiment
that ice hockey allows us to take advantage of, which in turn provides a good setting to test
for compensating behavior. In section 2 we describe the data and our empirical strategy.
In sections 3,4 and 5 we present and discuss our empirical results. Finally, in section 6 we
summarize and conclude.
1 Visors in Ice Hockey as a Natural Experiment
An on-going controversy in the National Hockey League (NHL), the top professional ice
hockey in the world, has to do with the fact that the use of visors in helmets is optional.
Visors are strong transparent ﬁber shields designed to protect a players’ eyes and face.
During our period of study, from 2001 to 2006, only a third of hockey players chose to wear
visors. This number appears to be exceedingly low if one takes into consideration the fact
4that year after year there are horrifying and high proﬁle cases of players that become gravely
injured for the lack of use of a visor. There are two reasons commonly associated to this
behavior. First hockey players believe that their performance may be compromised, as sweat
and dirt in the visor may interfere with the player’s vision. Second, ice hockey is commonly
associated with a macho subculture in which it is important to send the signal that one is
courageous enough so much so that wearing a visor may send a detrimental signal to other
players. The extent to which the lack of visor use has to do with a perceived reduction in
performance or to peer pressure is unclear. Interestingly, it may be argued that visor use
can give a player a sense of additional security that, instead of reduce his performance, may
actually help him play better as, for instance, wearing a visor may allow him to manage risk
better.
Ice hockey provides an ideal natural experiment to test for compensating or oﬀsetting
behavior for two reasons. First, a particular feature that aﬀects all players that end up
in the NHL has to do with the fact that before, and sometimes after, playing in the NHL-
where visor use is optional- players participate in North American or European feeder leagues
which had mandatory visors by the time they were playing.3 As a consequence, we are able
to track individual playing careers for the diﬀerent cohorts of NHL players during the 2001-
2006 seasons and retrieve their play statistics for seasons played at leagues which mandated
them to use a visor during their time they played there. Importantly, these changes in visor
regulation give us an exogenous source of variation in visor use. Players must wear a visor
for exogenous reasons unrelated to their characteristics, since conditional on playing in the
NHL, every single player had at least one season in a feeder league that mandated him to
wear a visor.
This feature of ice hockey allow us to set a research design similar to a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences. We are able to observe which players stop using visors once they get into the
NHL as well as which players use one regularly during the 2001-2006 seasons. Non-users are
the treated players, since they are the ones aﬀected by mandatory visor rules in other leagues.
Regular users are the control group, since they always use some kind of face protection
regardless of league-speciﬁc rules. The latter are not aﬀected, or at least are less likely to be
aﬀected, by mandatory visor rules in other leagues. The 2001-2006 seasons in the NHL are
those for which the treatment is not active. The seasons played in leagues with compulsory
visor use are those for which the treatment is active. Moreover, we can control for player
ﬁxed eﬀects as we are able to track the same set of players throughout their entire careers.
3Some of these feeder leagues changed their visor regulation during our period of study. Most notably,
the AHL, CHL and EHL, some of the most important minor pro leagues mandated visors between 2003 and
2006. For our purposes, we are only interested in the seasons in which visors were already mandatory.
5The comparison with players that are not aﬀected by mandatory visor rules, but which are
similar in other ﬁxed characteristics allows us to control for league speciﬁc eﬀects under the
premise that similar players that only diﬀer in their use of a visor in the NHL follow similar
trends when playing in diﬀerent leagues, ignoring the eﬀect of visors. If this is the case, any
diﬀerence in performance between both group of players in leagues with mandatory visors
with respect to the NHL must be caused by the exogenous imposition of visors.
Another advantage of ice hockey is that it allows us to capture changes in behavior.
We are able to measure individual aggressive or reckless behavior with precision by looking
at the penalties committed in games. A penalty committed on the ice is a punishment
for behavior that is deemed inappropriate. It is enforced by detaining the oﬀending player
within a so-called penalty box for a set number of minutes, during which, the player is not
allowed to play. The oﬀending team usually cannot replace the player on the ice, leaving
them with one player short during the penalty period. The statistic used to track penalties
is called “Penalty Infraction Minutes” (PIM) or “Penalties in Minutes” which represents the
total amount of penalties measured in minutes accrued by a player during a period. This
statistic is a very good proxy to measure potential compensating behavior of the player
during a season, as this variable captures a very detailed and standardized set of behavior
that is directly linked with recklessness, risky behavior, and aggressiveness of the player.
Typical behavior that is penalized in the form of either a “minor” penalty or a “major”
penalty which are assigned a speciﬁc and pre-deﬁned time of penalty in minutes include
charging, boarding, elbowing, kicking, head shots, attempt to injure other players, ﬁghting,
cross-checking, abuse to oﬃcials, and several others that are clearly spelled out in the NHL
rules, as described in Appendix 1.4
2 Data and empirical strategy
2.1 Data
Our sample consists of data containing detailed characteristics of 763 professional hockey
players who were active in the NHL between the 2001 and 2006 regular seasons. For each of
4Contrary to what one would expect, head injuries are not the most adequate variable to capture compen-
sating or oﬀsetting behavior. On the one hand, reckless or more aggressive behavior is not reﬂected in such
injuries only, but in a more general pattern of behavior, precisely the one captured by penalties in minutes.
On the other hand, because of this macho subculture that permeates ice hockey, injuries in general, and
head injuries (e.g., concussions) in particular, tend to be concealed by players and thus, accurate statistics
on actual head injuries, beyond the obvious ones (e.g., eye injuries), which may be biased, are diﬃcult to
obtain. Furthermore, a current controversy in the NHL is directly related to the fact that frequent times
head shots have produced injuries that have not been penalized by referees as they were deemed legal.
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this league. We ﬁnd that 250 of the players in our sample, nearly 30% of the total number
of players, used a visor regularly while 513 players never did. For each player we collect a
broad set of personal characteristics including date of birth, birthplace, weight, height, the
year of his ﬁrst season in the NHL, position, experience, and several others.
The key feature in this paper is that we are able to follow these players throughout
their entire playing career prior to their arrival to the NHL and thus we can collect their
corresponding playing statistics for the seasons in which they played in leagues that did
require a mandatory use of visors, if this was the case. These leagues include European elite
leagues, minor pro leagues, Canadian junior leagues, U.S. junior leagues, and college leagues.
Appendix 2 shows the corresponding regulation regarding visor use for the diﬀerent leagues
included in this paper and the year at which mandatory visor use was ﬁrst introduced.
In particular, for each of these players we collect a set of play statistics, including goals,
assists, games played, and penalty in minutes for each of the following seasons, provided that
the player took part in any of them: i) the 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006 NHL seasons,
which we identify by a dummy Ml = 0 and label “NHL seasons”, and ii) any other season
during the career of the player in a league other than the NHL that mandated him to use a
visor, which we identify by a dummy Ml = 1 and label “other leagues’ seasons”.5 It should
be noted that we exclude seasons in leagues other than the NHL, for which either the player
is not forced to wear a visor, or we do not have enough information to attribute visor use. In
fact, while it may be the case that a league may have compulsory rules related to visor use,
sometimes grandfather clauses exempting some players are applied when such regulation is
ﬁrst introduced. We take a conservative approach and exclude any data on players that
belong to an exempted group for a particular season. Out of the 763 players in our sample,
there were 716 who played at least one season in leagues other than the NHL in which they
were required to wear a visor. We can safely assume that players used a visor during these
seasons for exogenous reasons, given that compliance is automatic.
Our unit of observation is player-per-season. For the players who used visors in the
NHL during 2001-2006, we are able to obtain data on 1012 player-per-seasons in the NHL,
and 1139 player-per-seasons in the other leagues. On the other hand, for the players who
did not use visors in the NHL, we observe 2315 player-per-seasons in the NHL, and 2620
player-per-seasons in other leagues. Table 1 summarizes the main variables of interest used
in this study. The table is divided in two columns. The ﬁrst column summarizes the data
for those players who use a visor during their NHL career. The second column summarizes
the data for players who did not. We show the statistics for the NHL 2001-2006 seasons
5We do not have data for 2004 as during this year there was a league lockout.
7in one column, and the statistics for seasons in other leagues in the other. The table also
summarizes the main characteristics of the players.
As shown in the table, players who used visors in non-NHL leagues scored more goals,
gave more assists and were assessed less penalty minutes than players who never used visors.
Since all players had to use a visor or worse, full face protection in these leagues, these
diﬀerences cannot be attributed to the protective equipment, and suggest that players who
use a visor in the NHL are systematically diﬀerent from those who do not use one. Our
data suggest that more aggressive players inherently do not use visors while high-performing
players inherently do so. This simple observation implies that any cross sectional estimate
of the eﬀect of visors would be biased as users are a non random sample. The table also
shows that players who use visors are more likely to come from Europe and be less tall and
heavy, although there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in their age or experience in the NHL.
As mentioned above, the key dependent variable used in this study is penalty in minutes
per game. As mentioned above, this variable is deﬁned as the total amount of time that
a player was detained in a penalty box for rule transgressions on the ice rink, which are
typically linked with aggressiveness and recklessness, as shown in Appendix 1. We normalize
this measure by dividing it by the total number of games played. At the heart of our estimate
lies the fact that, although users of visors are inherently less aggressive (1.11 penalty minutes
as compared with 1.59 penalty minutes received by non-users in leagues with mandatory
visors), they become more aggressive relative to non-users when these players remove their
visors (penalty minutes decrease from 1.11 to 0.63 for users and from 1.59 to 0.96 for non-
users in their NHL seasons). Thus, as long as the equal trends assumption holds, visor use
must account for the 0.14 additional penalty minutes per game received by users in their
NHL seasons. This simple calculation shows the importance of gathering statistics for feeder
or European leagues as this eﬀect would be impossible to ﬁnd in cross sectional data.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
As the above discussion suggests, cross-sectional estimates of the eﬀect of visors on other
variables are likely to be biased, since players with particular characteristics that cannot be
observed use visors. Exploiting the panel dimension of the NHL seasons cannot do the job,
either. This is because only a limited number of players changed their visor status during this
period, thus limiting variation. Moreover, these changes may occur for endogenous reasons.
For instance, a player may realize that NHL hockey is more dangerous than he initially
thought; he may choose to wear a visor during the subsequent season and he could choose
to play more cautiously. Thus, variation in visor usage within the NHL may be endogenous,
and estimates with panel data for the NHL seasons only may be biased.
8In fact, one would like to compel players who are not using a visor to use one in order to
compare their performance and statistics, relative to other players who did not change their
visor status. This is exactly what occurs when players move from (or to) minor, junior, college
or European leagues, where visors are mandatory, to the NHL, where such use is optional.
This variation in league regulations regarding visor use is the key to this paper. It provides a
large exogenous source of variation in visor use that allows us to overcome problems typically
confronted in previous research and thus help us estimate a causal impact. It is exogenous
because players are forced to use a visor, and this has nothing to do with their unobservable
characteristics since all the players have to go through one or more of these leagues before
playing in the NHL.
The basic equation we estimate is given by
yisl = αi + θl + κs + βNVi × Ml + εisl. (1)
Here yisl is any outcome for player i during season s at league l. NVi is a dummy that takes
the value 1 if the player never used a visor during the 2001-2006 NHL regular seasons, and 0
otherwise. 6 Ml is another dummy that takes the value 0 for the NHL seasons between 2001
and 2006 and 1 for seasons played in other leagues where the player was forced to use a visor
at that time. Strictly speaking, our notation should include M with a player and a season
subscript, as many leagues changed their visor rules during the years we observe and some
leagues had grandfather clauses. However, we use Ml as a constant for a given league in our
sample since, as explained above, we dropped the observations in non-NHL leagues in which
the player was not forced to wear a visor. We estimate the model with a full set of player,
league and season ﬁxed eﬀects (αi,θl and κs). In some speciﬁcations we drop the ﬁxed eﬀects
and replace them for observable player characteristics such as age, birth year, height, weight,
birth place, other individual characteristics, and the dummy NVi, which captures common
characteristics of players not using a visor. Finally, εisl is the error term.
The OLS coeﬃcient β of the interaction term NVi ×Ml consistently estimates the eﬀect
of using a visor on the outcome y, as long as players who use a visor and players who do not
use a visor (but are similar in all other dimensions), follow similar trends when moving from
(or to) non-NHL leagues to (or from) the NHL. At the heart of our identiﬁcation assumption
we have a typical diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach. The treated group consists of players
who did not use a visor in the NHL, and hence are likely to be aﬀected by a rule mandating
it in other leagues, while the control group consists of players who used visors in the NHL
and are less likely to be aﬀected by such a rule. In this setting instead of pre-treatment and
6Our results are robust to diﬀerent coding for this variable. In particular, we do not use changes in visor
use for a particular player during his NHL seasons as this may be endogenous.
9post-treatment periods, we have leagues in which the treatment is active that is, seasons in
non-NHL leagues, as well as leagues in which the treatment is not active, namely the NHL.
Our identiﬁcation assumption is apparent once one notices that β is given by (ignoring
those players who changed their visor during 2001-2006, ﬁxed eﬀects and other controls)
b β =
h
b E(y|M = 1,NV = 1,V = 1) − b E(y|M = 0,NV = 1,V = 0)
i
−
[E(y|M = 1,NV = 0,V = 1) − E(y|M = 0,NV = 0,V = 1)].
(2)
Here V is a dummy equal to 1 if the player is using a visor and 0 otherwise. Thus, β
estimates the local eﬀect of a visor, on those who do not use one, E(y|M = 0,NV = 1,V =
1) − E(y|M = 0,NV = 1,V = 0), as long as
b E(y|M = 1,NV = 1,V = 1) − b E(y|M = 0,NV = 1,V = 1) =
b E(y|M = 1,NV = 0,V = 1) − b E(y|M = 0,NV = 0,V = 1),
(3)
which is an equal trends assumption. Given the importance of this assumption, we will
discuss it thoroughly and present some evidence showing that it holds.
While player ﬁxed eﬀects reduce the bias arising from the fact that users and non-users
are inherently diﬀerent in many ﬁxed characteristics, they are not suﬃcient to guarantee
identiﬁcation. The interaction may be capturing heterogeneous eﬀects of playing in the
NHL, or diﬀerences in adaptation between users of visors and non users of visors. However,
ﬁxed eﬀects make the equal trends assumption more plausible, since we just have to assume
that similar players who are only diﬀerent because one wears a visor at the NHL and the other
does not, follow similar trends in non-NHL leagues relative to the NHL, ignoring the eﬀect of
visors. In the above equation, league eﬀects capture common diﬀerences between groups as
they move to play in diﬀerent leagues, while season eﬀects capture common trends in hockey
aﬀecting all players. We also allow for diﬀerential trends by league in some speciﬁcations.
The last issue when estimating equation 1, is that the error term may be serially correlated.
Thus we clustered errors by player, since league and season ﬁxed eﬀects will partially remove
other types of serial correlation, and we do not have enough clusters at that aggregation
level.
3 Results
Table 2 shows diﬀerent estimates of model 1. The ﬁrst row shows our estimates for the eﬀect
of a visor, which is the coeﬃcient of the interaction term, β. In the ﬁrst four columns we
exclude player ﬁxed eﬀects and replace them with observable characteristics and a dummy for
players who do not use visors, NVi, which captures common characteristics among this group
of players. In these columns, the coeﬃcient of this dummy, reported in the row “No-visor
10type”, can be interpreted as a measure of self-selection bias arising from group diﬀerences.
The last two columns include player ﬁxed eﬀects. We include season and league eﬀects except
for the ﬁrst column; player characteristics including age, experience, birth year, birth region
and others; and in column 4 and 6 we allow for diﬀerent time trends in each major category
of leagues (NHL, minor pro, junior U.S., junior Canada, major junior, college and European
leagues). All models have standard errors clustered at the player level.
As shown in the table, we estimate that visors increase penalty in minutes per game by
0.2. This is a large eﬀect, especially when taking into account that the average penalty in
minutes per game in the NHL was about 0.8 during our period of study. An average player
plays about 50 games in the regular season, so using a visor causes about 5 penalty minutes
per season. This is a local eﬀect that tells us how penalty minutes would change for a player
who does not use a visor if he is suddenly forced to use one. Our estimates suggest that there
is compensatory behavior as players feel more protected. The cost of aggressive skating falls
and players respond by playing more recklessly and aggressively, as implied by the increase
in penalty minutes. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and it is fairly stable across
speciﬁcations.
When player ﬁxed eﬀects are not included, the dummy for players who do not use visors in
the NHL is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This dummy shows that there is considerable
selection bias, and players who do not use a visor in the NHL are less cautious to start with.
This is precisely why it is so important to use minor league statistics as part of our natural
experiment as pure cross-sectional estimates will be biased.7
As mentioned above, a concern is that players using visors in the NHL may adapt diﬀer-
ently compared to players who do not use them, or performance and behavior may evolve in
a diﬀerent way for visor users and non-users as they move from other leagues to the NHL.
It could also be the case that diﬀerent penalization standards or league characteristics may
have an heterogeneous eﬀect on both groups of players, and thus the equal trends assumption
may not hold. In order to provide some evidence in support of the equal trends assump-
tion, which is the key identiﬁcation assumption required for our results, we conduct some
robustness exercises in Table 3.
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 3 exploit the NHL lost season of 2004 due to contract
issues. During this year, there was no regular season in the NHL and several players migrated
to professional leagues in Europe or minor pro leagues in North America which already had
instituted mandatory visor rules. This speciﬁcation is helpful because players were already
7In fact, cross sectional estimates using the NHL seasons as a pooled sample show a negative relationship
between using a visor and penalty minutes per game, but since players who use a visor are more cautious to
start with, this result is due to pure selection bias.
11used to NHL hockey and were forced to change leagues because of an exogenous event.
Overall, these leagues are not very diﬀerent from the NHL, especially given the fact that the
intention of the players was to keep in shape. In these two columns we estimate model 1, but
we redeﬁne the dummy variable Ml. In this case it takes the value of 1 when it corresponds
to a player in his 2004 season, if he played in a professional league with mandatory visors.
On the other hand, it is set to 0 for the NHL regular seasons during 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005
and 2006. As shown in the table, these estimates suggest that using a visor increases penalty
minutes per game in about 0.5, which is considerably larger than our baseline estimates. In
this case, the identiﬁcation assumption becomes more plausible because we only need players
to follow equal trends as they moved to other professional leagues during the NHL lockout.
In the next two columns of Table 3 we exclude college, U.S. junior and European leagues
and keep Canadian feeder leagues only, which are considered to be the closest to the NHL.
Our estimates are not aﬀected by restricting our sample and remain positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. This result is important because it shows that our estimates are not driven by
diﬀerences in adaptation by group to Canadian hockey, or its rules, which may diﬀer from
the European ones or College rules. These regressions also show that the eﬀect is not driven
by college leagues, where full face protection is required.
The above table also rules out other potential confounding factors. For instance, it may
be argued that leagues other than the NHL may apply diﬀerent penalization standards that
may impact more aggressive players diﬀerently, thus biasing our original estimate. However,
European leagues tend to be regarded as less tolerant towards violence than the NHL; while
Canadian feeder leagues are regarded as more tolerant towards violence than the NHL. Thus,
the fact that we get a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of visor use on penalty minutes using
both comparison groups, suggest that our main result is not driven by systematic diﬀerences
in penalization standards across leagues. That is, our results hold either when we compare
NHL seasons to seasons in leagues that tolerate less violence (European leagues in columns
1-2), or when we compare NHL seasons to seasons in leagues which tolerate more violence
(Canadian feeder leagues in columns 3-4).8
In the last two columns of Table 3 we control for heterogeneous adaptation to diﬀerent
leagues using a parametric approach. We rank the diﬀerent categories of leagues according
to how many of their players end up becoming NHL players. This ranking starts with the
NHL itself and suggests that minor pro leagues are more alike the NHL. We then have the
European leagues followed by major junior and junior leagues, and ﬁnally college leagues.
8According to the conventional wisdom Canadian feeder leagues appear to tolerate more violence than
the NHL. At the NHL level, players are careful not to take penalties because they do not wish to put their
team shorthanded, and they are under pressure from coaches not to risk injury (i.e. the cost of a penalty is
higher at the NHL level). At lower levels, there is much more ﬁghting and thus more penalty minutes.
12These two columns present estimates in which we control for an interaction term between
the rank number of a league and a dummy that identiﬁes players who never used visors in
the NHL seasons. This approach is analogous to what is done in a typical diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence analysis when including group speciﬁc trends as a robustness check. We ﬁnd that
this variable is not statistically signiﬁcant, but its negative sign suggests that players who
did not use a visor in the NHL, and were inherently more aggressive, became more aggressive
as they moved from lower ranking leagues to the NHL or other professional leagues, ignoring
the eﬀect of visors. This ﬁnding implies that, if anything, this diﬀerential trend would create
a downward bias in our estimate, making our baseline estimate a lower bound. Consistent
with this, our estimates are larger than in our base case scenario once we control for the
diﬀerence in trends.
As shown in the descriptive statistics of our sample, visor use is less prominent among
Europeans, heavier and taller players and is also correlated to a player position. Thus, it
could be the case that players who diﬀer in these characteristics may adapt in distinct ways to
the NHL. This possibility would violate the equal trends assumption and bias our estimates.
In order to rule this out, we include interactions of the “treatment leagues” dummy, Ml,
with observable players’ characteristics, which control for potential diﬀerences in adaptation
to the NHL between visor users and non-users. The ﬁrst column in Table 4 shows estimates
controlling for diﬀerent adaptation by birth and year of ﬁrst NHL season; that is, a full set
of interactions between Ml and years of birth and ﬁrst NHL season. The second column
in Table 4 shows estimates controlling for diﬀerent adaptation by position; that is, a full
set of interactions between Ml and position dummies. The third column in Table 4 shows
estimates controlling for diﬀerent adaptation by weight and height; that is, a full set of
interactions between Ml and these variables. The fourth column in Table 4 shows estimates
controlling for diﬀerent adaptation by birthplace; that is, a full set of interactions between
Ml and dummies for players born in Canada, the U.S. or Europe. In the last column we
include all controls simultaneously. In all the speciﬁcations our estimates remain positive
and signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcients become smaller. These results suggest that our results
are not driven by diﬀerential adaptation to the NHL among players with diﬀerent observable
characteristics related to visor use.
We also conduct a series of placebo tests in order to verify the equal trends assumption
in a non-parametric way. Table 5, presents diﬀerent placebos in which we drop the NHL
seasons, and explore whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between visor users and non-
users, as they move from-and-to leagues that require mandatory use of visors. If there are
no diﬀerences in adaptation and the equal trends assumption holds, one would not expect
any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between both types of players, as visor regulation is the same in
13these leagues where players had to use a visor or full face protection. To do this, we remove
the NHL seasons and estimate the interaction of NVi with dummies for diﬀerent subsets of
leagues. In the ﬁrst two columns we use a dummy which takes the value 0 for seasons in
minor pro leagues and 1 otherwise. The negative and not signiﬁcant coeﬃcient suggest that,
consistent with the equal trends assumption, there are no diﬀerences between visor users
and non-users as they move from European or junior leagues to the minor pro leagues. In
the third and fourth column we estimate the same model but excluding European leagues,
which are also professional leagues. The results are very similar and suggest that there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between visor users and non-users as they move from junior or college
leagues to minor pro leagues.
In the last two columns in Table 5, we perform a similar exercise but we use a dummy
which takes the value of 0 for European leagues and 1 for junior and college leagues. Again,
we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between visor users and non-users behavior as they
move from junior or college leagues to European leagues. Our evidence suggests that the
equal trends assumption holds, at least for movements of players between these feeder and
European leagues. The signs of the placebo tests suggest that, if anything, players who do
not use visors and are more inherently aggressive, become even more so as they move to
more competitive leagues, relative to players who use visors. Thus our baseline estimates
are biased against our hypothesis and hence represent a lower bound.9
Our results also hold when including team eﬀects in order to control for sorting by team,
as Canadian-based teams may tend to be more aggressive than US-based teams. They
also hold when excluding college seasons, and to diﬀerent variable deﬁnition of the no-visor
dummy, NV . These results are available upon request.
4 Do Visor Use Reduce Performance?
We are also able to test whether the use of visors has an impact on performance, measured
by assists and goals per game. Table 6 shows our estimates when these variables are used
as outcomes. We ﬁnd no particularly robust or statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of wearing a
visor on performance. Player complaints about the use of visors reducing their performance
because they get fogged or are uncomfortable appear to be somewhat exaggerated. As some
9In a related exercise not reported here, we exclude the NHL seasons and include a full set of interactions
between dummies for each type of league and the dummy for players that do not use visors. Players who
do not use a visor do not play any diﬀerently in any two of these leagues. That is, the coeﬃcients of these
interactions are not statistically diﬀerent from one another. Results are available upon request. The placebo
test also show that our strategy is not capturing diﬀerential eﬀects of penalization standards, since we would
get signiﬁcant estimates if users and non-users were aﬀected diﬀerently by league speciﬁc standards.
14have argued, given that players skate with a visor during most of their careers, it should not
be too diﬃcult to get used to it in the NHL.10 Interestingly, this result is reassuring for our
identiﬁcation strategy for two reasons: First, as it is consistent with the fact that players
do not play more aggressively in order to compensate for any potential poorer performance
resulting from visor use. Second, this result indirectly suggests there are no diﬀerences in
adaptation by group to the NHL, at least in performance, which indirectly suggests that the
equal trends assumption holds.
The corresponding coeﬃcients on the dummy that accounts for players who do not use
visors imply that these players would decrease performance independently of visor use. There
is considerable self-selection bias in this dimension as well, with the better players using
visors. Any simple OLS cross-section results that show that players who use visors perform
better are not taking into consideration the endogeneity and upward bias implied by this
result.
5 Discussion
The logical question which immediately follows from the results presented above is why do
players skate without a visor in the NHL? We have shown that performance is not aﬀected
and that they can play more safely, while being able to take more risks and, perhaps, suﬀering
less injuries. It seems that the decision to use a visor is not determined by a trade-oﬀ between
safety and performance. Instead, our evidence suggests that using a visor may be related to
a predominant culture in ice hockey by which players who wear a visor are considered weak
or less manly whereas those who do not use visors are considered tough. In fact, according to
the conventional wisdom, there is a negative stigma associated with using visors in the NHL
that is responsible for the low rate of use. Our results appear to conﬁrm such conventional
wisdom.
Players who do not use visors in the NHL are inherently more aggressive or more reckless
than those who do wear a visor. This suggests that skating without a visor may be acting
as signal for toughness, while using one signals lack of it. Visors may be a credible signal
because players that are not tough enough prefer protection, while tough players may be
willing to sacriﬁce some of it. Not using a visor is a credible signal because only tough
players can aﬀord it. Moreover, it may be the case that players may beneﬁt from others
thinking that they are tough (e.g., either the crowd or other players). Examples of this sort
of behavior can be also found in biology, where it is known as the “Handicap eﬀect” and is
10 However, it may be the case that while visors may reduce vision and performance, they may also allow
players to take on additional risks, and both eﬀects could cancel each other out.
15also analogous to signaling theory in economics (see Zahavi (1975)).
Our data does not support an alternative explanation in which players do not use a visor
because it reduces their relative performance, and as a consequence there are players skating
without one because they lack a commitment technology to enforce its use. This insight is
similar to the one presented by Schelling about helmet use in hockey (see Schelling (1978)).
In fact, when players are polled by the players’ union (NHLPA) about use of visors, they
have repeatedly rejected the idea of making their use mandatory in the NHL.
Either in the Zahavi signaling model or the Schelling model, it may be Pareto improving
to mandate visors. In the signaling case, mandating visors make their use uninformative
about a players’ type, or removes the stigma associated with it. Players would no longer
use a visor because they are not tough enough, but because they have to. In the Schelling
model it makes all players safer without altering their relative performance. There may be
other situations in which an intervention is justiﬁed. For instance, this would be the case
when government has better information than the agents, or if the agents systematically
underestimate risk.
Many researchers have focused their attention on determining if compensatory behavior
oﬀsets all the gains from more protection on the number of injuries or fatalities. From a
welfare perspective this is irrelevant. If an agent (e.g., a hockey player) can increase his safety,
his utility will increase even if he exhibits compensatory behavior, a direct consequence of the
envelope theorem. It may be the case that if visors became mandatory, players who did not
use them because of the stigma they carried, would start playing more aggressively, as our
ﬁndings suggest. As a consequence, the number of injuries to these players may increase,
despite the greater protection, but the direct eﬀect of the visor will always dominate the
indirect eﬀect of the oﬀsetting behavior. Thus, players may become more frequently injured,
but would also play more aggressively, skate faster, and perhaps move better in the ice. Their
“utility” as players would increase.
However, the existence of compensatory behavior creates some additional complexities.
First, if agents have complete information and rationally choose not to adopt a safety mea-
sure, in the absence of externalities, they would be worse-oﬀ if they are forced to do so.
Second, there is a direct positive eﬀect on agents (envelope theorem), but they may also
be subject to other individuals’ risky behavior. For instance, in the case of seat belt laws,
pedestrians and other drivers suﬀer from the less cautious driving of others who are forced
to wear seat belts. In ice hockey, players do not face the risk of their own behavior only, but
also the risk created by other players who skate with visors. Thus, optimal policy should
balance between the private gains from protection and the negative eﬀect from externalities
or spillovers created by others. The existence of spillovers means that mandating visors
16or, for that matter, any safety measures is not necessarily optimal, even if non-users are
signaling their type or there is a commitment problem.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we provide empirical evidence on the Peltzman eﬀect, or compensating behavior
by using data at the individual level from ice hockey at both minor and major leagues. We
take advantage of the fact that during the full playing career of a typical professional player
the use of visors in helmets has not always been voluntary. By exploiting this variation we are
able to apply a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach, and control for player ﬁxed eﬀects to sort
out the speciﬁc impact of visor on increased aggressiveness, as measured by the penalty times
accrued by the player during games. Whereas increased aggressiveness occurs, thus showing
the presence of the Peltzman eﬀect, visor use does not signiﬁcantly aﬀects performance.
The implications of our ﬁndings are not limited to ice hockey or, for that matter, sports.
More generally, we show that behavior changes as a result of perceived protection by the
individual. We provide causal evidence that the imposition of safety measures can have
perverse eﬀects that can go against the originally intended objective of such measure to
the point that the overall eﬀect may be detrimental to society. In fact, such economy-wide
implications of our research raise the question of whether or not governments should attempt
to save us from ourselves.
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18Table 1: Summary Statistics.
Visor in NHL (2001-2006) No visor in NHL (2001-2006)
NHL Other leagues NHL Other leagues
Games played 56.87 40.66 47.00 41.53
( 25.26) ( 19.39) ( 28.25) ( 20.42)
Goals per game 0.18 0.33 0.11 0.28
( 0.14) ( 0.26) ( 0.12) ( 0.24)
Assists per game 0.32 0.50 0.19 0.43
( 0.20) ( 0.34) ( 0.16) ( 0.31)
Penalty minutes per game 0.63 1.11 0.96 1.59
( 0.49) ( 0.94) ( 0.89) ( 1.34)
Number of players 250 228 513 488
Visor in NHL (2001-2006) No visor in NHL (2001-2006)
Birth year 1976.32 1976.56
( 4.18) ( 4.08)
Born in Canada 0.41 0.63
( 0.49) ( 0.48)
Born in Europe 0.47 0.21
( 0.50) ( 0.41)
Born in U.S. 0.12 0.16
( 0.33) ( 0.37)
First season 1997.40 1997.92
( 4.29) ( 4.43)
Weight 200.19 204.74
( 13.19) ( 15.80)
Height 5.79 5.82
( 0.39) ( 0.38)
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of the main variables used in the paper. Standard
deviation is reported in parentheses below the mean. The columns labeled “NHL” include
game statistics for the NHL regular seasons 2001,2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006, while the columns
labeled “Other leagues” include game statistics for the same players when they were playing in
leagues with mandatory visors either in Europe or in minor leagues in North America. There
was no NHL regular season in 2004.
19Table 2: Estimates of the impact of using a visor on penalty minutes per game.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eﬀect of visor 0.165∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.066) (0.062) (0.062) (0.057) (0.056)
No-visor type 0.331∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045)
R-squared 0.114 0.197 0.304 0.307 0.619 0.620
Observations 7347 7347 7334 7334 7347 7347
Season eﬀects N Y Y Y Y Y
League eﬀects N Y Y Y Y Y
Player attributes N N Y Y Y Y
Player eﬀects N N N N Y Y
League trends N N N Y N Y
Notes: This table shows estimates of the impact of using a visor on penalty in minutes
per game. In the ﬁrst four columns we control for diﬀerent player characteristics and the
dummy NVi. The coeﬃcient on this dummy reported in the second row, captures common
characteristics among non-users. The last column shows estimates including players ﬁxed
eﬀects. Player attributes include age, experience, year of birth, draft year, weight and
height. Robust standard errors clustered at the player level are shown in parentheses
below each point estimate. For the reported coeﬃcients, those with ∗∗∗ are signiﬁcant at
the 1% level; those with ∗∗ are signiﬁcant at the 5% level; and those with ∗ are signiﬁcant
at the 10% level.
20Table 3: Robustness checks of the impact on penalty minutes.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Using only Using only Including
lockout years Canadian leagues treated trends
Eﬀect of visor 0.403∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗ 0.174∗∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.295∗∗
(0.170) (0.181) (0.091) (0.083) (0.133) (0.122)
No-visor type 0.196∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 14.972
(0.038) (0.043) (18.824)
R-squared 0.276 0.659 0.360 0.667 0.304 0.619
Observations 3630 3637 5353 5358 7334 7347
Player eﬀects N Y N Y N Y
Notes: This table shows estimates of the impact of using a visor on penalty in minutes
per game using alternative sub-samples. The ﬁrst two columns show estimates in
which we compare NHL performance to that of other leagues during 2004, when the
NHL was in a lockout. The next two columns show estimates in which we do not use
the data from European, college or U.S. junior leagues. Finally, the last two columns
show estimates in which we control for treated players speciﬁc trends (both for time
and league ranking). Odd columns show estimates without ﬁxed eﬀects controlling
for common characteristics among non-users (NVi). Even columns show estimates
including players ﬁxed eﬀects. All the speciﬁcations include a full set of controls,
including league eﬀects, season eﬀects and player characteristics. Robust standard
errors clustered by player are shown in parentheses below each point estimate. For
the reported coeﬃcients, those with ∗∗∗ are signiﬁcant at the 1% level; those with ∗∗
are signiﬁcant at the 5% level; and those with ∗ are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
21Table 4: Robustness checks controlling for diﬀerences in adaptation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Eﬀect of visor 0.207∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.054) (0.052)
R-squared 0.624 0.623 0.623 0.622 0.629
Observations 7347 7347 7334 7347 7334
By cohorts Y N N N Y
By position N Y N N Y
By weight and height N N Y N Y
By birthplace N N N Y Y
Notes: This table shows estimates of the impact of using a visor on penalty in minutes
per game. All estimates include players ﬁxed eﬀects. We include interactions of a
dummy that takes into account treatment leagues, Ml, with diﬀerent characteristics
of the players in order to control for potential diﬀerences in adaptation to the NHL.
The latter include birthplace, year of ﬁrst season, playing position, weight, height,
and date of birth. Robust standard errors clustered at player level are shown in
parentheses below each point estimate. For the reported coeﬃcients, those with ∗∗∗
are signiﬁcant at the 1% level; those with ∗∗ are signiﬁcant at the 5% level; and
those with ∗ are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
22Table 5: Placebo test of the impact of using a visor on penalty minutes per game.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Minor pro as Minor pro as European leagues as
“pre-treatment” I “pre-treatment” II “pre-treatment”
Eﬀect of visor -0.005 -0.006 -0.077 -0.202 0.001 -0.081
(0.161) (0.185) (0.174) (0.241) (0.144) (0.158)
No-visor type 0.370∗∗ 0.443∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.177) (0.111)
R-squared 0.289 0.671 0.330 0.721 0.296 0.698
Observations 3929 3937 2544 2544 3462 3470
Player eﬀects N Y N Y N Y
Notes: This table shows estimates of the diﬀerences in adaptation to leagues with similar
visor regulation. The ﬁrst two columns show estimates comparing visor users and non-
users in minor pro leagues relative to that in feeder or European leagues. The next two
columns show estimates comparing visor users and non-users in minor pro leagues relative
to that in other feeder leagues, excluding European leagues. Finally, the last two columns
show estimates comparing visor users and non-users in European leagues relative to that
in junior and college leagues. All speciﬁcations include a full set of controls. Robust
standard errors clustered by player are shown in parentheses below each point estimate.
For the reported coeﬃcients, those with ∗∗∗ are signiﬁcant at the 1% level; those with ∗∗
are signiﬁcant at the 5% level; and those with ∗ are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
23Table 6: Estimates of the impact of using a visor on performance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assists per game Goals per game
Eﬀect of visor 0.013 -0.009 -0.010 0.001 -0.013 -0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.032) (0.012) (0.013) (0.027)
No-visor type -0.090∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.008)
R-squared 0.463 0.610 0.610 0.467 0.587 0.587
Observations 7334 7347 7347 7334 7347 7347
Player eﬀects N Y Y N Y Y
Treated trends N N Y N N Y
Notes: This table shows the impact of using a visor on performance. The ﬁrst three
columns show estimates on assists per game, the last three columns show estimates
on goals per game. All models include a full set of controls, including league eﬀects,
season eﬀects, player characteristics and league speciﬁc trends. Robust standard errors
clustered by player are shown in parentheses below each point estimate. For the
reported coeﬃcients, those with ∗∗∗ are signiﬁcant at the 1% level; those with ∗∗ are
signiﬁcant at the 5% level; and those with ∗ are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
24Appendix 1: Infractions that result in Penalty in min-
utes
• Abuse of oﬃcials: Arguing with, insulting, using obscene gestures or language directed
at or in reference to, or deliberately making violent contact with any on or oﬀ-ice
oﬃcial.
• Aggressor penalty: Assessed to the player involved in a ﬁght who was the more ag-
gressive during the ﬁght. This is independent of the instigator penalty, but both are
usually not assessed to the same player (in that case the player’s penalty for ﬁghting
is usually escalated to deliberate injury of opponents, which carries a match penalty).
• Attempt to injure: Deliberately trying to harm an opponent.
• Boarding: Pushing an opponent violently into the boards while the player is facing the
boards.
• Butt-ending: Jabbing an opponent with the end of the shaft of the stick. It carries an
automatic major penalty and game misconduct.
• Charging: Taking more than three strides or jumping before hitting an opponent.
• Checking from behind: Hitting an opponent from behind. It carries an automatic
minor penalty and misconduct, or a major penalty and game misconduct if it results
in injury. Illegal check to the head: Lateral or blind side hit to an opponent, where
the player’s head is targeted and/or the principal point of contact
• Clipping: Delivering a check below the knees of an opponent. If injury results, a major
penalty and a game misconduct will result.
• Cross-checking: Hitting an opponent with the stick when it is held with two hands and
no part of the stick is on the ice. Delay of game: Stalling the game.
• Diving: Falling to the ice in an attempt to draw a penalty.
• Elbowing: Hitting an opponent with the elbow.
• Fighting: Engaging in a physical altercation with an opposing player, usually involving
the throwing of punches with gloves removed or worse.
• Goaltender Interference: Physically impeding or checking the goalie.
25• Head-butting: Hitting an opponent with the head. A match penalty is called for doing
so.
• High-sticking: Touching an opponent with the stick above shoulder level. A minor
penalty is assessed to the player. If blood is drawn, a double-minor is usually called.
Referees may use their discretion to assess only a minor penalty even though blood was
drawn. They may also assess a double-minor when blood is not drawn, but he believes
that the player was suﬃciently injured or that the oﬀending player used excessively
reckless action with his stick.
• Holding: Grabbing the body, equipment, or clothing of opponent with hands or stick.
• Holding the stick: Grabbing and holding an opponent’s stick, also called when a player
deliberately wrenches a stick from the hands of an opposing player or forces the oppo-
nent to drop it by any means that is not any other penalty such as Slashing.
• Hooking: Using a stick as a hook to slow an opponent, no contact is required.
• Instigator penalty: Being the obvious instigator in a ﬁght. Called in addition to the
ﬁve minute major for ﬁghting.
• Interference: Impeding an opponent who does not have the puck, or impeding any
player from the bench.
• Joining a ﬁght: Also called the “3rd man in” rule, the ﬁrst person who was not part
of a ﬁght when it broke out but participates in said ﬁght once it has started for any
reason (even to pull the players apart) is charged with an automatic game misconduct
in addition to any other penalties they receive for ﬁghting.
• Kicking: Kicking an opponent with the skate or skate blade. Kicking carries a match
penalty if done with intent to injure, but otherwise carries a major penalty and a game
misconduct.
• Kneeing: Hitting an opponent with the knee.
• Roughing: Pushing and shoving after the whistle has been blown or checking an op-
ponent with the hands in his face.
• Slashing: Swinging a stick at an opponent, no contact is required.
• Slew Footing: Tripping an opponent by using your feet.
• Spearing: Stabbing an opponent with the stick blade.
26• Starting the wrong lineup: When oﬀending team fails to put the starting lineup on the
ice at the beginning of each period.
• Substitution infraction: When a substitution or addition is attempted during a stop-
page of play after the linesmen have signaled no more substitutions or if a team pulls
its goalie and then attempts to have the goalie re-enter play at any time other than
during a stoppage of play.
• Too many men on the ice: Having more than six players (including the goalie) on the
ice involved in the play at any given time.
• Tripping: Using a stick or one’s body to trip an opponent.
• Unsportsmanlike conduct Arguing with a referee; using slurs against an opponent or
teammate; playing with illegal equipment; making obscene gestures or abusing an
oﬃcial.
27Appendix 2: Leagues in Ice Hockey
Table 7: Hockey leagues and visor regulation.
Name Short name League type Face protection
National Hockey League NHL Pro Visors are non-mandatory
United Hockey League UHL Minor pro Mandatory since 2004
American Hockey League AHL Minor pro Mandatory since 2006
East Coast Hockey League ECHL Minor pro Mandatory since 2003
Central Hockey League CHL Minor pro Mandatory since 2004
Western hockey league WHL Major junior (CA) Mandatory since 1976
Ontario hockey league OHL Major junior (CA) Mandatory since 1976
Quebec Major junior hockey league QMJHL Major junior (CA) Mandatory since 1976
British Columbia Junior Hockey League BCJHL Junior (CA) Mandatory since 1981
Ontario Provincial Junior A Hockey League OPJHL Junior (CA) Mandatory since 1981
British Columbia Hockey League BCHL Junior (CA) Mandatory since 1981
Saskatchewan Junior Hockey League SJHL Junior (CA) Mandatory since 1981
Atlantic Junior Hockey League AJHL Junior (CA) Mandatory since 1981
Metropolitan Junior Hockey League MetJHL Junior (CA) Mandatory since 1981
Ontario Junior Hockey League OJHL Junior (CA) Mandatory since 1981
Canadian Junior Hockey League CJAHL Junior (CA) Mandatory since 1981
United States Hockey League USHL Junior (U.S.) Always been mandatory
North American Hockey League NAHL Junior (U.S.) Always been mandatory
Western Collegiate Hockey Association WCHA College (NCAA) Mandatory since 1980
Central Collegiate Hockey Association CCHA College (NCAA) Mandatory since 1980
NCAA East Division H-East College (NCAA) Mandatory since 1980
Eastern College Athletic Conference ECAC College (NCAA) Mandatory since 1980
National Collegiate Athletic Association NCAA College (NCAA) Mandatory since 1980
College Hockey Association CHA College (NCAA) Mandatory since 1980
International Hockey League IIHL International Mandatory since 1994
Sweden Elitserien SEL European elite Mandatory since 1969
Finland SM-liiga FNL European elite Mandatory since 1988
Russian Elite League KHL European elite Mandatory since 1994
Switzerland National League A Swiss-A European elite Mandatory by 2004
Deutsche Eishockey League DEL European elite Mandatory since 1998
Notes: This table shows the diﬀerent leagues used in our study, as well as their respective regulation regarding
facial protection. In college leagues, players are required to use a full cage if they are under 18, and may choose
between full cage or a visor if they are older. Mandatory visors were introduced in European and international
leagues with a “grandfather clause” which exempted some players from using a visor. We take that into account
when coding the variable Ml.
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